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Respondents R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Philip Morris USA, Inc., and Lorillard
Tobacco Company--collectively, the Original Participating Manufacturers ("OPMs") under the
Master Settlement Agreement ("MSA")--respectfully submit the following brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case

Contrary to the State of Idaho's opening assertion, this appeal is not "about arbitrators'
powers." App. Br. at 1. Rather, this appeal is about the power of courts. The District Court
correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Idaho's challenge to the arbitrators'
jurisdiction, because Idaho has demonstrated no cognizable injury from the arbitrators' exercise
of jurisdiction and thus lacks standing to sue.
As the District Court summarized, Idaho filed a motion seeking to vacate in part an
arbitration award that implements a comprehensive settlement between 22 other States
("Signatory States") and dozens of Participating Manufacturers ("PMs") with respect to
longstanding disputes concerning the NPM Adjustment under the MSA. See Vacatur Order at 12; R., pp. 485-86. More specifically, Idaho asserted that the arbitration Panel for the 2003 NPM
Adjustment dispute lacked jurisdiction to enter the provisions of the Settlement Award that
addressed post-2003 NPM Adjustments: i.e., the provisions that implemented the settlement's
terms governing the amount and mechanism of certain monetary payments for post-2003 NPM
Adjustments as among the Settling Parties. See id.
The District Court held that Idaho lacks standing to raise a jurisdictional objection to the
Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions. See Vacatur Order at 4-7; R., pp. 488-91. The court
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concluded-as had the arbitration Panel of three former federal judges-that the challenged
provisions concerning the Settling Parties' post-2003 payments under the settlement do not
impose any cognizable injury on Idaho's recovery of its potential share of post-2003 payments
under the MSA. See id Of particular importance here, it was undisputed that, although the
Settlement Award released to the Signatory States their potential share of post-2003 NPM
Adjustment funds that were held in an escrow account for disputed payments, Idaho has no right
under the MSA to the Signatory States' released funds, and Idaho's own potential share of post2003 NPM Adjustment funds remained safely in the escrow account pending the final resolution
of the State's dispute with the PMs over those funds under the MSA. See id.
Notably, Idaho on appeal implicitly concedes that most of the Settlement Award's post2003 provisions do not harm the State, and thus it drastically narrows the scope of its requested
relief. Instead of challenging the Panel's jurisdiction to enter all of the Settlement Award's post2003 provisions, the State now makes only one narrow assertion-namely, that the Panel should
not have rejected its objection that the MSA prohibits "selective releases" from the escrow
account and thus prohibits granting the Signatory States an early release of their potential share
of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds unless Idaho's potential share of post-2003 NPM
Adjustment funds was also released early. See App. Br. at 1, 17. Simply put, the State claims
that it was "harmed" because the Panel refused to provide it with the benefits of a settlement that
it refused to join. But, as the District Court ruled, that counter-intuitive assertion fails to state a
cognizable injury; the MSA does not even arguably provide Idaho with any right to the favorable
treatment that the Signatory States received as consideration under the settlement, because it
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unquestionably does allow "selective releases" from the escrow account when only some parties
settle. See Vacatur Order at 6-7; R., pp. 490-91. Indeed, the Panel's interpretation of the MSA
in this regard applied equally to the selective release of 2003 NPM Adjustment funds, see
Settlement Award at 12-13; R., pp. 1502-03, which Idaho has not even challenged here (and
could not possibly challenge under the governing standard ofreview), see App. Br. at 17, 34.
The District Court was thus correct that Idaho lacks standing to challenge the Settlement
Award's post-2003 provisions. In any event, the Panel had jurisdiction to enter those provisions,
as doing so was necessary to resolve the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute among the Settling
Parties. This Court should affirm the denial of the State's vacatur motion.

B.

Course of the Proceedings & Statement of the Facts

As the State did, the OPMs have combined the Course of the Proceedings and the
Statement of the Facts because they are the same, given that the relevant facts arise from the
proceedings before the District Court and the arbitration Panel.

1.

The NPM Adjustment Under the MSA

In the MSA, numerous cigarette manufacturers and 52 States and local governments
settled litigation concerning cigarette marketing and sales. See Arbitration Order at 1-2; R., pp.
1863-64. Under the MSA, the PMs make annual payments that are apportioned among the MSA
States pursuant to each State's contractually specified Allocable Share. See id.; see also MSA
§§ IX(c), IXG); R., pp. 1590-91, 1614-17.
The NPM Adjustment is a potential reduction in the PMs' annual MSA payments. See
MSA § IX(d); R., pp. 1592-1610. It is designed to address the PMs' "concerns ... in entering
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into the MSA ... that other manufacturers would choose not to participate ["NPMs"], thereby
gaining a competitive advantage by avoiding" the restrictions placed upon the PMs.
Arbitration Order at 2; R., p. 1864.

See

For a given year, the Adjustment is available if the

disadvantages of the MSA were a "significant factor" contributing to the PMs' collective loss of
market share to the NPMs.

See id; see also MSA § IX(d)(l); R., pp. 1592-97.

If those

conditions are satisfied, a State may avoid its share of the Adjustment under the MSA only if it
enacted and "diligently enforce[ d]" against the NPMs a "Qualifying Statute," which generally
"requir[es] all NPMs selling cigarettes in the state to place a certain amount of money for every
cigarette sold annually into an escrow account." See Arbitration Order at 2; R., p. 1864. A State
that diligently enforced its Qualifying Statute for the year at issue is not subject to that year's
Adjustment, and its share of the Adjustment is "reallocated among all [the non-diligent States]
pro rata in proportion to their respective Allocable Shares" under the MSA, subject to the limit
that the non-diligent States can lose no more than their full share of the annual payment. See
MSA § IX(d)(2)(B)-(E); R., pp. 1597-1600.

2.

The Disputed Payments Account Under the MSA

An Independent Auditor administers payments under the MSA.

See MSA §§ XI(a),

XI(b); R., pp. 1620-22. If a dispute over the Auditor's payment calculations arises, the MSA
provides that the PMs may pay the disputed funds into escrow in a "Disputed Payments
Account" ("DPA"). See MSA § XI(d)(8); R., pp. 1627-28. The DPA is under the control of an
Escrow Agent that is guided by the directives of the Auditor. See MSA §§ XI(t)(2), XI(i); R.,
pp. 1629, 1638-44. Once a dispute over funds in the DPA is "resolved with finality," the funds
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are disbursed to the "appropriate payee" in accordance with the MSA. See id. Many of the PMs
have paid disputed NPM Adjustment funds into the DPA. See App. Br. at 7.
Given that Idaho's appeal now focuses on the Settlement Award's provisions governing
releases from the DPA, it is important to emphasize at the outset two undisputed points about
how the DPA operates under the MSA-points that Idaho's brief ignores even though they were
critical to the Panel's holding in the Settlement Award.

First, Idaho does not dispute that, under the MSA, the maximum amount of the NPM
Adjustment funds in the DPA that any individual State is potentially entitled to recover is its own

allocable share. In no circumstance is a State ever entitled to recover any portion of another
State's share; instead, the only parties that may recover a particular State's share are that State or
the PMs. See Br. of Maj. States [including Idaho) in Opp. to Award at 23-26; R., pp. 1928-31.

Second, Idaho also does not dispute that, as between a particular State and the PMs,
"under the MSA, the PMs have the right of first recovery." See Settlement Award at 12; R., p.
1502; see also Br. of Maj. States [including Idaho] in Opp. to Award at 23-26; R., pp. 1928-31.
In other words, an individual State is not entitled to receive its share of the NPM Adjustment
funds in the DPA immediately if and when it is found diligent. That is because, as discussed
above, the MSA's reallocation provisions allow the PMs to shift the diligent States' shares of the
NPM Adjustment to the non-diligent States in whole or in part. Supra at 4. As a result, even if a
State is determined to have been diligent, whether it may recover its funds from the DPA is not
"resolved with finality" until after the PMs' overall entitlement to the NPM Adjustment has been
resolved based on diligence determinations for the other States. (A diligent State that cannot
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initially recover its full share of the NPM Adjustment from the DPA for this reason will still
receive all its money through reallocation from the non-diligent States' next MSA payment.)

3.

The 2003 NPM Adjustment Dispute

The NPM Adjustments for 1999 through 2002 were resolved by settlement as to all the
States, but the NPM Adjustment for 2003 (and onward) was not.

As a consequence, the

Independent Auditor urged that the 2003 NPM Adjustment "dispute ... be submitted to binding
arbitration in accordance with subsection XI(c) of the MSA." Auditor Notice 0140 at 2; R., p.
1943. MSA § XI(c) requires that the parties submit to a "binding arbitration," "governed by the
United States Federal Arbitration Act," of "[a]ny dispute ... arising out of or relating to ... any
determinations made by[] the Independent Auditor (including, without limitation, any dispute
concerning ... any of the adjustments ... described in subsection IXG) ... )," one of which is the
NPM Adjustment. See R., p. 1622.
But the States refused to submit the dispute to arbitration. Idaho instead filed an action in
the District Court in 2006 seeking a declaratory order that it had diligently enforced for 2003.

See Arbitration Order at 1; R., p. 1863. The District Court, though, granted the PMs' motion to
compel arbitration, holding that "the NPM Adjustment, its functioning, allocation, and
application are all matters falling directly within the purview of-and specifically included
within-the NPM mandatory arbitration mechanism." See Arbitration Order at 7-8; R., pp.
1869-70. The District Court further observed that Idaho courts must construe the scope of
arbitration clauses broadly, by "order[ing] arbitration unless it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted
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dispute." See Arbitration Order at 10 (quoting Int 'I Ass 'n of Firefighters, Local No. 672 v. City
o_f Boise City, 30 P.3d 940,946 (Idaho 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted); R., p. 1872.
Ultimately, the courts of every MSA State but Montana ordered arbitration of the 2003
NPM Adjustment dispute. See, e.g., McGraw v. Am. Tobacco Co., 681 S.E.2d 96, 108-12 (W.
Va. 2009) (collecting cases). The parties selected an arbitration panel of three former federal
judges to resolve the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute.

The States picked the Hon. Abner J.

Mikva (D.C. Cir.), the PMs picked the Hon. William G. Bassler (D.N.J.), and those two picked
the Hon. Fem M. Smith (N.D. Cal.).

4.

The Partial Settlement

Midway through the arbitration, the PMs and 19 States agreed to a settlement, which is
memorialized in a binding Term Sheet. See R. 1491, 1508-27. All other States were invited to
join that settlement, and 3 more States did so before the arbitration concluded.

Those 22

"Signatory States" have an aggregate allocable share under the MSA of about 46%. 1
The settlement is a comprehensive one that not only resolves the 2003 NPM Adjustment
dispute among the Settling Parties, but also resolves or streamlines NPM Adjustment disputes
among them for subsequent years. Because of the massive delays engendered by the States'
relentless efforts to resist arbitration, the parties are only now concluding resolution of the 2003
Adjustment dispute, and the disputes over the 2004-2012 Adjustments remain backed up in the
arbitration queue, with disputes over post-2012 Adjustments sure to follow. It was important to

1

After the arbitration concluded, two more States separately settled with the PMs on similar
terms, bringing the aggregate allocable share of States that have settled to nearly 50%.
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the Settling Parties to simplify the future resolution of these disputes as among themselves
without affecting the Non-Signatory States.
As for the 2003-2012 NPM Adjustments, the PMs and the Signatory States resolved their
disputes completely. The PMs agreed to release to the Signatory States their allocable share of
the funds that were (or will be) placed in the DPA for these Adjustments, and the Signatory
States agreed to give the PMs specified credits against their future MSA payments for part of
these Adjustments. Term Sheet § I & App. A; R., pp. 1509, 1519-22. As the Panel found, "the
[DPA] funds to be released ... are integral provisions to the Settling Parties' settlement of the
2003 NPM Adjustment dispute." Settlement Award at 3; R., p. 1493. The DPA has grown
significantly due to the delayed resolution of the 2004-2012 NPM Adjustments, and none of the
Settling Parties were interested in continuing to leave those funds inaccessible after their disputes
had been resolved. (The PMs and the Signatory States also completely resolved potential future
disputes concerning the 2013-2014 NPM Adjustments, albeit on slightly different financial
terms. Term Sheet§ II; R., pp. 1509-10.)
As for the post-2014 NPM Adjustments, the PMs and the Signatory States streamlined
their potential future disputes. As among themselves, the Settling Parties agreed that certain
NPM cigarettes fall within the substantive scope of the Signatory States' diligent-enforcement
obligation, that the PMs will reimburse the Signatory States with a portion of an NPM
Adjustment allocated to any Signatory States that are found non-diligent, and that the Signatory
States will pay an additional automatic adjustment amount based on their non-collection of
escrow. Term Sheet§§ III.B.l, III.C.1-3; R., pp. 1510-14.
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Of course, the settlement's terms do not apply to the "Non-Signatory States" like Idaho
who declined to join the settlement. The settlement expressly provides that the Non-Signatory
States' allocable share of the DPA funds will remain there intact, and that none of the credits to
the PMs will be applied against the PMs' future payments to the Non-Signatory States. Term
Sheet App. A

11 4-6;

R., pp. 1521-22. Similarly, the settlement confirms that its provisions

streamlining any post-2014 NPM Adjustment disputes will not apply to the Non-Signatory
States, whose own liability remains governed by the MSA's diligent-enforcement and
reallocation provisions. Term Sheet § IV.J; R., p. 1516. Thus, contrary to Idaho's suggestion
(see App. Br. at 12), the Settlement Award's instructions to the Auditor that the Non-Signatory
States' potential share of the DP A funds should remain in the DPA was not intended to displace
Idaho's rights under the MSA, but rather to protect them-by ensuring that the Term Sheet's
release of the Signatory States' potential share of the DPA funds would not impair the NonSignatory States' ability to recover their potential share of the DPA funds under the MSA. See
Settlement Award at 6, 13; R., pp. 1496, 1503.

5.

The Settlement Award

Twenty-seven of the Non-Signatory States, including Idaho, objected to the settlement
and to any award that would direct the Auditor to comply with the settlement's terms. As
relevant here, the Non-Signatory States objected that: (1) the Panel would lack jurisdiction to
enter such an award, especially insofar as it addressed post-2003 NPM Adjustments; and (2) the
settlement's DPA releases and other terms were contrary to the MSA's provisions and thus
constituted impermissible amendments to the MSA without their consent. See, e.g., Br. of Maj.
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States [including Idaho] in Opp. to Award at 4-7, 22-35; R., pp. 1909-1912, 1927-1940; Idaho
Letter at 1-2; R., pp. 518-19.
After briefing and four days of hearings, the Panel rejected these objections and entered a
Stipulated Partial Settlement and Award.

See R., pp. 1491-1506.

The Settlement Award

thoroughly explained why the objections raised were baseless.

First, the Panel held that it had jurisdiction to implement the settlement under the
arbitration provision in MSA § XI(c) and governing law. Settlement Award at 2-5; R., pp. 149295. The Panel concluded that its undisputed jurisdiction over all issues "related to" the 2003
NPM Adjustment dispute encompassed "the authority to decide all matters necessary to dispose
of the [dispute]," including the "authority to determine the existence or effect of a settlement of
the dispute." Settlement Award at 2-3 (citing cases); R., pp. 1492-93. And that determination
required "rul[ing] on the objections" to the settlement. Settlement Award at 2; R., p. 1492.
With respect to the settlement's post-2003 terms in particular, the Panel emphasized that
those terms were "integral provisions" that needed to be implemented in order for the settlement
to go forward. Settlement Award at 3-4; R., pp. 1493-94. And the Panel explained that it had
the power to instruct the Auditor to follow them under the well-established law that "[t]ribunals
have jurisdiction" to give effect to "settlements that cover more than. the claim [being]
litigat[ ed]," "even where they would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the additional claims being
resolved." Settlement Award at 4 (citing cases); R., p. 1494. In so reasoning, the Panel made
clear that it was "just giving effect to the Settling Parties' agreed settlement payments as among
themselves," rather than "assessing the merits of any NPM Adjustment dispute, including
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particularly questions of diligence or non-diligence for any years other than 2003." Settlement
Award at 4-5; R., pp. 1494-95.
Second, the Panel held that the release of the Signatory States' potential share of the DPA
funds for the 2003-2014 NPM Adjustments was proper under the DPA provisions in MSA
§ XI(t)(2) and § XI(i), because the settlement "resolve[d] with finality" the "dispute" over those
funds given that "the PMs have waived th[eir] right [to those funds] for the Signatory States."
Settlement Award at 5, 12; R., pp. 1495, 1502. The Panel emphasized that "[t]he PMs' limited
DPA waiver for the Signatory States in no way prejudices the Non-Signatory States, legally or
otherwise." Settlement Award at 13; R., p. 1503. To the contrary, the Award expressly protects
the rights of the Non-Signatory States, by providing that their potential share of the DPA funds
under the MSA shall "remain[] in the DPA," and that they will be entitled when the dispute over
those funds is finally resolved to recover the same amount they "would have recovered" under
the MSA absent the release to the Signatory States. Settlement Award at 6, 13; R., pp. 1496,
1503. Conversely, though, while the settlement cannot and does not harm the Non-Signatory
States' rights under the MSA, nor does the MSA give the Non-Signatory States any right to the
benefits of the settlement that they declined to join:

"[t]he Non-Signatory States have no

entitlement to the favorable treatment that the PMs have afforded the Signatory States as part of
the consideration for settling their dispute." Settlement Award at 13; R., p. 1503.
More generally, the Panel held that none of the other objected-to terms of the settlement
"constitutes an amendment to the MSA that requires the consent of any Non-Signatory States
under MSA § XVIII(j)." See Settlement Award at 14-15; R., pp. 1504-05. The Panel concluded
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that "the Term Sheet is not an 'amendment' of the MSA at all," but rather "a settlement of
disputes that have arisen under the MSA as written." Id.

And regardless, the Panel further

observed that consent for any amendment to the MSA is required only from parties who are
"affected," which "the Panel construe[d] ... to mean 'materially prejudiced by."' Settlement
Award at 15; R., p. 1505. The Panel concluded that the Non-Signatory States could not satisfy
that standard, because they are not "bound by any terms in the [settlement]." Id. 2

6.

Idaho's Motion to Vacate in Part the Settlement Award

Idaho requested the District Court to vacate the Settlement Award's provisions that "dealt
with monies for years after 2003," "on the ground these sections go beyond the 2003 NPM
Adjustment Arbitration Panel's power." Vacatur Motion at 1; R., p. 189; accordVacatur Memo.
at 17-19; R., 392-94. Notably, consistent with the State's claim that the Panel lackedjurisdiction
to address post-2003 issues, Idaho sought vacatur of all of the Settlement Award's post-2003
provisions and none of the Settlement Award's 2003 provisions.
On the one hand, Idaho requested vacatur of post-2003 provisions that had nothing to do

with the DPA, let alone with the State's potential share of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds in
the DPA: e.g., the credits from the Signatory States' annual payments that the PMs receive for
the 2004-2014 NPM Adjustments; the automatic adjustment amounts that the Signatory States

2

The Settlement Award also contains a provision governing how the 2003 NPM Adjustment will
be allocated, in light of the Signatory States' settlement, among the remaining Non-Signatory
States who are subject to the Adjustment. See Settlement Award at 3, 9-11, 13-14; R., pp. 1493,
1499-1501, 1503-04. That provision, however, does not affect Idaho, because the PMs
ultimately decided after conducting discovery not to contest Idaho's diligence for 2003, and thus
Idaho is not subject to the 2003 NPM Adjustment at all. See App. Br. at 8.
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provide to the PMs for the post-2014 NPM Adjustments; and the reimbursements that the PMs
provide to the Signatory States for the post-2014 NPM Adjustments. See Vacatur Motion at 1
(requesting vacatur of, among other things, Settlement Award §§ II.2 to the extent it incorporated
Term Sheet

,r,r I (for years after 2003),

III.B.1, III.C.1); R., p. 373. On the other hand, and of

particular relevance here, Idaho did not seek vacatur of the Settlement Award's determination
that selectively releasing the Signatory States' potential share of the 2003 NPM Adjustment
funds in the DPA was neither contrary to the MSA nor prejudicial to the Non-Signatory States.
See id. (requesting vacatur of Settlement Award §§ III, V.4 only as applied to "years after

2003").

7.

The District Court's Order Denying Vacatur

The District Court held that "Idaho has no standing" to challenge the Settlement Award's
post-2003 provisions. Vacatur Order at 7; R., p. 491. The court first concluded that Idaho "must
show a 'distinct palpable injury"' even when raising a jurisdictional objection to an arbitration
award. Vacatur Order at 5; R., p. 489. And the court then expressly agreed with the Panel that
Idaho will not suffer "any legal prejudice or adverse effect . . . as a result" of the Settlement
A ward's post-2003 provisions. Vacatur Order at 6; R., p. 490. Of most relevance now, the court
explained that "[t]he 'selective release of post-2003 funds' from the DPA is not a cognizable
injury," because "Idaho's share of the disputed funds remains in the DPA," "its right to future
shares is unaffected," and it "does not have a right to the favorable treatment received by the
[Signatory] States in consideration for their entering the Term Sheet." Vacatur Order at 6-7; R.,
pp. 490-91.
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ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Issue 1. Whether Idaho lacks standing to seek to vacate the Settlement Award's post-

2003 provisions on jurisdictional grounds, given that the State's sole asserted injury-i.e., the
Panel's ruling upholding the selective release of post-2003 funds from the DPA-(a) is unrelated
to most of the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions, and (b) is not a cognizable injury under
the MSA's DPA provisions, as confirmed by the Panel's unchallenged and unchallengeable
ruling upholding the selective release of 2003 funds from the DPA.
Issue 2. Whether the Panel had jurisdiction to enter the Settlement Award's post-2003

provisions, given that doing so was necessary to implement the Settling Parties' resolution of the
2003 NPM Adjustment dispute among themselves, especially in light of objections to the
lawfulness of the settlement that were raised by Idaho and other Non-Signatory States?
ARGUMENT

Idaho lacks standing to seek vacatur of any of the Settlement Award's post-2003
provisions. And in any event, the Panel had jurisdiction to enter all of those provisions. This
Court should therefore affirm the District Court's judgment denying the State's vacatur motion.
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IDAHO HAS NO
STANDING TO SEEK VACATUR OF THE SETTLEMENT AWARD'S POST2003 PROVISIONS

The District Court held that Idaho must demonstrate a cognizable injury in order to
establish its standing to challenge the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions, and the court
further held that Idaho had failed to show any such injury. On appeal, the State essentially
concedes the first holding, and its attack on the second holding is both limited and meritless.
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A.

The State Must Demonstrate Cognizable Injury From The Settlement
Award's Post-2003 Provisions In Order To Have Standing To Challenge The
Panel's Jurisdiction To Enter Those Provisions

"It is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence that a person wishing to invoke a

court's jurisdiction must have standing." Young v. City of Ketchum, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (Idaho
2002). The core element of standing is that the plaintiff must prove "an injury in fact," which
"requires a showing of a 'distinct palpable injury'" caused by the challenged conduct. Id.; see
also Noh v. Cenarrusa, 53 P.3d 1217, 1219 (Idaho 2002) (holding that the requisite injury cannot

be "speculative"). Although the State is "entitled to special solicitude in the standing analysis,"
it too must at least identify a "complained-of harm," not just an abstract violation of law. See
Wasden v. State Bd. of Land Commr's, 280 P.3d 693,697 (Idaho 2012).

Accordingly, as the Panel recognized, the "general rule ... is that a non-settling party
does not have standing to object to a settlement between other parties." See Settlement Award at
12 (citing, among other cases, Jamie S. v. 1\1ilwaukee Pub. Schs., 668 F.3d 481, 501 (7th Cir.
2012), and In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d 1089, 1102-03 (10th Cir. 2001)); R., p. 1502.
Instead, a non-settling party has standing to object only if the settlement creates "plain legal
prejudice" to its own rights. See id. This Court applied these principles in State v. Continental
Casualty Co., 879 P .2d 1111 (Idaho 1994).

There, after a university settled an insurance

coverage dispute with one of its two insurers, the second insurer tried to challenge the adequacy
of the settlement. See id. at 1113-14. This Court held that the non-settling insurer "ha[d] no
standing to challenge the sufficiency of [the settling insurer's] payment," because "the adequacy
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of (that payment] ha(d] no effect on [the non-settling insurer's] rights or liabilities" under its
insurance contract and the governing law. See id. at 1119.
Notably, Idaho concedes on appeal that it must (at least) allege an "injury in fact" from
the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions in order to have standing to raise its jurisdictional
objection to those provisions. See App. Br. at 18. The State thus has abandoned its unsuccessful
argument below that injury is unnecessary to establish standing where the particular claim
presented happens to be ajurisdictional objection to an arbitration award. See Vacatur Order at
4-5; R., pp. 488-89.

The State declines to re-raise that argument here for good reason:

"[s]tanding is a preliminary question" that "focuses on the party seeking relief and not on the

issues the party wishes to have adjudicated." Young, 44 P.3d at 1159 (emphasis added).
Given the State's concession, it is entirely irrelevant whether, under the Federal
Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. § I et seq., jurisdictional defects in an arbitration award are
treated for purposes of judicial review as "trial" errors that require a further showing of
"prejudice" or as "structural" errors that do not so require. See App. Br. at 25-27 (discussing this
issue). The trial/structural dichotomy pertains to whether the alleged error in an arbitration
award sufficiently undermines the award that it warrants vacating the award on the merits under

the FAA. For either type of error, however, the challenged award itself must be sufficiently
injurious to the plaintiff that the plaintiff has standing to seek vacatur under the FAA in the first
place. Yet here, as demonstrated below, the fundamental flaw in Idaho's vacatur motion and
appeal is that the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions do not injure the State at all.
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B.

The State Fails To Demonstrate Cognizable Injury From The Settlement
Award's Post-2003 Provisions

As a preliminary matter, it warrants emphasis that the State's appellate brief expressly
abandons almost all of the relief that it originally sought in its vacatur motion. Idaho now
disclaims its request to vacate the Settlement Award's myriad post-2003 provisions that have
nothing to do with the DPA, and even disclaims its request to vacate the Settlement Award's
provisions that released the Signatory States' potential share of the post-2003 NPM Adjustment
funds in the DPA. Compare App. Br. at 17, 34, with Vacatur Motion at 1; R., p. 189. Idaho
evidently takes this extraordinary action because it cannot dispute the conclusion of the District
Court and the Panel that the State suffers no cognizable injury from those post-2003 provisions
that implement the settlement's terms governing the amount and mechanism of post-2003
payments among the Settling Parties. See Vacatur Order at 5-7; R., pp. 489-91; Settlement
Award at 12-14; R., pp. 1502-04. Of particular relevance here, the State implicitly concedes that
it has no right under the MSA to the Signatory States' potential share of the post-2003 funds
released from the DPA, that its own potential share of the post-2003 funds remains protected in
the DPA, and that it will ultimately recover the same amount of those funds, once the dispute
over them is finally resolved with the PMs, as it would have recovered under the MSA absent the
release of the Signatory States' potential share. See Vacatur Order at 7; R., p. 491; Settlement
Award at 13; R., p. 1503; see also supra at 5-6, 11.
Accordingly, the State on appeal limits its vacatur request to any post-2003 provisions in
the Settlement Award that "prohibit Idaho from sharing in [the early] release of post-2003 NPM
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Adjustment funds" by "deny[ing] release of post-2003 NPM Adjustment funds to Idaho." See
App. Br. at 17, 34. But, as the District Court correctly held and as further shown below, "[t]he
'selective release of post-2003 funds' from the DPA is not a cognizable injury," because the
MSA does not provide Idaho with "a right to the favorable treatment received by the [Signatory]
States in consideration for their entering the Term Sheet." Vacatur Order at 6-7; R., pp. 490-91.

1.

The Panel thoroughly explained that selectively releasing DP A funds was

permissible "under the MSA" because the Signatory States and the Non-Signatory States were
differently situated with respect to "finality" in light of the settlement. See Settlement Award at
12-13; R., pp. 1502-03.

More specifically, the Panel held that, for purposes of the DPA

provisions in MSA § XI(f)(2) and § XI(i), the settlement had "resolve[d] with finality" the
dispute concerning the Signatory States' potential share of the 2003 NPM Adjustment funds in
the DPA, because "the PMs have waived th[eir] right [to those funds] for the Signatory States."
See Settlement Award at 5, 12; R., pp. 1495, 1502. That waiver was sufficient to "allow[] the

Signatory States to recover their Allocable Share of th[e] DPA funds," the Panel reasoned,
because the Signatory States were the only parties with a claim to those funds once the PMs
waived their "right of first recovery." See Settlement Award at 12; R., p. 1502; see also supra at
5-6. In fundamental contrast, the "dispute" over the Non-Signatory States' potential share of the
2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA was not "resolved with finality," because the PMs had
not waived their right of first recovery against those funds and "[t]he Non-Signatory States have
no entitlement to the favorable treatment that the PMs have afforded the Signatory States as part
of the consideration for settling their dispute." See Settlement Award at 13; R., p. 1503.
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Thus, contrary to the State's assertion that the Panel "displaced the MSA" with the Term
Sheet when it upheld the selectivity of the post-settlement DPA releases (see App. Br. at 27-31),
the Panel in actuality interpreted the MSA's DPA provisions to allow selectively releasing DPA
funds in light of the partial settlement. And tellingly, Idaho's brief does not address, let alone
refute, the Panel's interpretation that the partial settlement's limited waiver of the PMs' right of
first recovery from the DPA created "finality" for the Signatory States but not for the NonSignatory States. See id. at 31-33 (ignoring that interpretation of the "resolved with finality"
language in the MSA's DPA provisions, and citing instead various other MSA provisions that
have nothing to do with determining when a dispute over DPA funds has been "resolved with
finality"). Moreover, the only two MSA courts to have considered the Panel's interpretation of
the MSA's DPA provisions have agreed with that interpretation: (1) the District Court below,
see Vacatur Order at 6-7; R., pp. 490-91; and (2) the Colorado MSA court, when denying that

State's request for a preliminary injunction against the selective DPA releases, see State ex rel.
Suthers v. R.J Reynolds Tobacco Co., No. 1997CV3432, Hr' g Tr. at 118, 123 (Colo. Dist. Ct.

Apr. 11, 2013) ("essentially agree[ing]" that "a settlement" can be "a final determination under
[the] MSA['s DPA provisions]" and that "there's nothing explicit, necessarily, in the MSA" that
compels the States to "remain unified" when settling disputes concerning NPM Adjustment
funds in the DPA); R., pp. 1837-38. 3

3

The decisions by the MSA courts in Pennsylvania and Missouri that Idaho cites (see App. Br. at
29-30) are inapposite. Those decisions (which are being appealed) did not vacate the Settlement
Award's DPA provisions, but rather a different and unrelated provision-namely, the provision
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2.

Idaho's lack of cognizable injury from the Panel's ruling upholding the selectivity

of the post-2003 DPA releases is especially clear because the very same ruling also upheld the
selectivity of the 2003 DPA releases, and that application of the ruling is unchallenged by Idaho
and unchallengeable under the FAA.
There is no dispute that the Settlement Award's provisions upholding the selectivity of
the DPA releases encompassed 2003 NPM Adjustment funds. See App. Br. at 9, 12. The
Settlement Award does not even contain provisions separately upholding the selectivity of DPA
releases for post-2003 and for 2003: there is a single set of DPA provisions that applies to both.
See Settlement Award §§ III.1-3, V.4 DPA; R., pp. 1496-97, 1502-03. Indeed, Idaho itself

specifically insisted that the Panel must determine whether the MSA allowed selectively
releasing DPA funds for 2003, by "object[ing] to any premature release from the DPA, even

if

structured to apply only to the 2003 NPM Adjustment." Idaho Letter at 2 (emphasis added); R.,

p. 519; accord Br. of Maj. States [including Idaho] in Opp. to Award at 4-5; R., pp. 1909-10.
Yet there also is no dispute that Idaho has not requested vacatur of the Panel's
determination that the MSA permitted selectively releasing the 2003 NPM Adjustments funds
from the DPA. See App. Br. at 13, 34. Moreover, any such request would have been futile. The
State itself concedes that the Panel had jurisdiction to determine the proper disposition under the
MSA of the 2003 NPM Adjustment funds in the DPA. See id. at 7-8; see also infra at 22-23
(continued ... )

governing how the 2003 NPM Adjustment should be reallocated among the non-diligent NonSignatory States in light of the settlement. See id; see also supra at 12 n.2 (explaining that this
provision of the Settlement Award is inapplicable to Idaho).
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(demonstrating the Panel's jurisdiction to rule on the 2003 DPA funds). And the merits of the
Panel's interpretation of the MSA's DPA provisions cannot be second-guessed under the FAA's
extremely narrow standard for judicial review of arbitration awards. See, e.g., Oxford Health

Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013) ("So long as the arbitrator was 'arguably
construing' the contract ... a court may not correct his mistakes .... ").
3.

Finally, contrary to the State's suggestion (see App. Br. at 18-19), the foregoing

analysis of why the State lacks a cognizable injury does not improperly conflate the legal merits
of the State's claim with the State's standing to bring that claim. Where a legal issue pertaining
to the plaintiff's standing is "separate and independent" from the plaintiff's merits claim, courts
must adjudicate that issue at the outset, because they may not "assum[e] jurisdiction based upon
a hypothetical legal injury." See Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1137-38 (10th Cir. 2007); see

also, e.g., Troutner v. Kempthorne, 128 P.3d 926, 927-30 (Idaho 2006) (rejecting Democratic
plaintiffs' standing to challenge whether the Governor had appointed more Republicans to the
Idaho Judicial Council than was statutorily allowed, because the statute did not give Democrats
any legal right to be appointed even assuming the Republican appointment was invalid).
Here, Idaho itself effectively concedes that its standing to bring its merits claim-i. e., the
objection that the post-2003 DPA ruling exceeded the Panel's authority under the arbitration

provision in MSA § XI(c)-tums on the distinct legal question whether selectively releasing DPA
funds is prohibited under the DPA provisions in MSA § XI(/)(2) and § Xl(i).

In particular,

Idaho's sole argument for why vacating the post-2003 DPA ruling on jurisdictional grounds will
"redress [its] claimed injury" is that the State will then be able to "receive post-2003 funds from
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the DPA because that is what the MSA provides." See App. Br. at 20. But, of course, as the
District Court and Panel both held, the MSA unquestionably provides no such thing, either for
2003 or for post-2003. Accordingly, the State's jurisdictional challenge to the post-2003 DPA
ruling is "based upon a hypothetical legal injury" that cannot support standing, see Day, 500 F.3d
at 1137-38, and so the District Court's denial of Idaho's vacatur motion should be affirmed.

II.

THE PANEL CORRECTLY HELD THAT IT HAD JURISDICTION TO ENTER
THE SETTLEMENT AWARD'S POST-2003 PROVISIONS
In any event, the District Court's denial of the State's vacatur motion may be affirmed on

the alternative ground that the Panel properly concluded that it had jurisdiction to enter the
Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions. Given that "arbitration is a favored remedy," a party
asserting that a particular dispute falls outside the scope of a valid arbitration clause must
provide "positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute," and any "[ d]oubts are to be 'resolved in favor of coverage.'" City

of Boise City, 30 P.3d at 946 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc 'ns Workers ofAm., 475 U.S.
643,650 (1986)). The State does not meet that heavy burden.
The Panel itself thoroughly explained why it had jurisdiction to enter the Settlement
Award, including the post-2003 provisions, under the MSA's arbitration provision, the District
Court's Arbitration Order, and settled law. To start, the Panel recognized that "its jurisdiction
under Section XI( c) of the MSA and the court orders compelling arbitration includes 'all issues
"related to"' the 2003 NPM Adjustment dispute." Settlement Award at 2; R., p. 1492; accord
Arbitration Order at 8 ("[T]he NPM Adjustment, its functioning, allocation, and application are
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all matters falling directly within the purview of-and specifically included within-the NPM
mandatory arbitration mechanism."); R., p. 1870. This jurisdiction, as the Panel next noted,
encompasses "the authority to decide all matters necessary to dispose of the [dispute]," including
the "authority to determine the existence or effect of a settlement of the dispute" and "to rule on
the objections" to the settlement. Settlement Award at 2-3 (citing, among other cases, Ross Bros.
Constr. Co. v. Int'/ Steel Servs., 283 F.3d 867, 875 (7th Cir. 2002), and United Steel Workers
Int'/ Union v. TriMas Corp., 531 F.3d 531, 539 (7th Cir. 2008)); R., pp. 1492-93.
The Panel then held that the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions fall within this
jurisdictional authority. It observed that the post-2003 terms were "integral provisions" that
needed to be implemented in order for the partial settlement of the 2003 NPM Adjustment to go
forward.

Settlement Award at 3-4; R., pp. 1493-94. And so the Panel invoked the well-

established law that "[t]ribunals have jurisdiction" to give effect to "settlements that cover more
than the claim [being] litigat[ed]," "even where they would lack jurisdiction to adjudicate the
additional claims being resolved." Settlement Award at 4 (citing, among other cases, Abramson
v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1968), and Nottingham Partners v. Trans-

Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1991)); R., p. 1494; see also Stolt-Nielsen SA v.
Anima/Feeds Int'!, 559 U.S. 662, 684-85 (2010) ("[I]t is appropriate to presume that parties that
enter into an arbitration agreement implicitly authorize the arbitrator to adopt such procedures as
are necessary to give effect to the parties' agreement."). In so reasoning, the Panel made clear
that it was "just giving effect to the Settling Parties' agreed settlement payments as among
themselves," rather than "assessing the merits of any NPM Adjustment dispute, including
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particularly questions of diligence or non-diligence for any years other than 2003." Settlement
Award at 4-5; R., pp. 1494-95.
Once again, Idaho's brief does not address, let alone refute, the Panel's rationale.
Instead, the State just cites several cases where arbitration awards were vacated because the
arbitrators inexplicably ruled on issues that had never actually been submitted to arbitration. See
App. Br. at 23-25. Yet the State's reliance on such cases ignores the obvious distinction that the
Panel here ruled on post-2003 issues only because doing so was necessary to resolve among the
Settling Parties the 2003 dispute that had been submitted to arbitration.
Nor does Idaho have any basis for complaining that one of the post-2003 issues resolved
by the Panel was that the Non-Signatory States are not entitled under the MSA to the same
favorable DPA treatment that the PMs have afforded the Signatory States. See id at 22-23. As
discussed earlier, Idaho expressly objected to the settlement on the ground that the selectivity of
the 2003 DPA release was invalid under the MSA. Supra at 20. Thus, having itself effectively
"submitted (the selective DPA release] issue to the arbitrator," Idaho cannot claim that the Panel
lacked jurisdiction to rule against it on that issue. See Oxford Health, 133 S. Ct. at 2068 & n.2;

see also Abramson, 392 F.2d at 762.
In sum, the PMs have demonstrated that the Panel plainly had jurisdiction to enter all of
the Settlement Award's post-2003 provisions. At a minimum, though, Idaho has not provided
this Court with "positive assurance" to the contrary. See City of Boise City, 30 P.3d at 946.
Accordingly, the State has failed to satisfy its heavy burden for seeking vacatur of the Settlement
Award's post-2003 provisions.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the judgment of the District Court denying the State of Idaho's
Motion to Vacate in Part the Partial Award of the 2003 NPM Adjustment Arbitration Panel.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this 27th day of June, 2014.
JONES DAY

BRASSEY CRAWFORD & HOWELL, PLLC

Attom s for R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company,
and with permission on behalf of Philip Morris
USA, Inc., and Lorillard Tobacco Company
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